Wednesday, March 1, 2023

Military Concept Art

Military Concept Art - At the end of the day, the foundation of any serious study of martial arts will lie in the "cannon" of great men like Carl von Clausewitz, Sun Tzu and Antoine-Henri Jomini. The reason they continue to dominate is obvious: they define the contours of war and war, as we understand it, and no one has come up with anything better without resorting to serious violence to military and political history. Fourth Generation War (4GW) and Unlimited Warfare (UW), two doctrines that are sometimes offered as successors to the Clausewitzian vision, could not distinguish between politics and violence to say anything about problems with Van Creveld's ideas. Of the Trinity and not the Trinity. Warfare and Mary Kaldor's concept of New Wars. However, Canon does not (and should not) remain stable. Gray's latest book on strategy recognizes a diverse circle of strategists whose work includes general theories of strategy, some of which are not traditionally recognized by Orthodox strategists. As more and more theorists and practitioners are recognized as pioneers of the military art, they will be added similarly to the Canon of Operations and Strategy. Some accepted notions will be indisputably created and edited. While the present is not as disturbing as it is often claimed, all bets on the future are closed in a way that current macroeconomic trends, emerging technologies and geopolitics can be combined in a way that can shake the world well. It's our reference system. It would be a shame if design theory and implementation disappeared during the anti-access / denial zone era. Today, US operations in the Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia pose a wide range of threats and complexities, ranging from sophisticated technology to intermittent threats such as cyber warfare and paramilitary special operations units. Forced warfare is characterized not only by high technical calculations, but also by nonlinearity, self-organization, and complexity. Criticism of the design reached home precisely because the American approach tended to yield the best strategic results. As Echevarria noted in his article about the military's misguided approach to the Center of Gravity (COG), military planners can limit the search for COG - as defined in their professional military education. They - at the expense of losing a bigger strategic picture. If such a mitigation approach is problematic during periods of unrivaled prominence, it is even more dangerous in what may be a polar age. 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Military bases have declined globally as a result of the Cold War, even in the United States and China, which have continued to upgrade with new quality and capabilities. Priced at AU $ 49.71 AU $ 49.71, one might wonder if this is really unreasonable. Not all interpretations of strategy incorporate in their core relationship between foreign considerations of force and politics, even in classical strategic concepts. Jomini did not. Perhaps he assumed that such relationships would be automatically established under state pressure, making their coding in the strategy unnecessary. Others, such as Clausewitz, Svechin, and Liddell Hart, may have been skeptical of its automatic creation, establishing the link between force and politics as part of the core of strategy. Luttwak did not send the relationship to a certain level, but emphasized all of the relationships at all strategic levels, Luttwak still There is a place in the middle. As long as the understanding of the relationship is somewhere, whether it is in strategy or in the art of operation, or - perhaps more dubiously - in the space between separate ideas, does it matter under the label of the relationship? ? Strategy and management are the material of the operational art, and the success of operational development depends on the successful solution of individual strategic problems by the forces and the provision of all the materials they need to operate without interruption. The ultimate goal. Is achieved. Based on the goals of an operation, the art of operation defines a whole series of strategic missions and some logistics requirements. Operational art also defines the baseline of an operation, depending on the time-allocated material for the management of different strategic missions, the forces that can be deployed for combat at a specific front and the last at On the nature of the operation itself. [Xi] Price AU $ 26.33 AU $ 26.33 Meanwhile, the concept of Canon survived both for device and practical reasons. It is easy to argue that the "common sense" concept of the foundation is too restrictive, but too radical to discard the idea of ​​a foundation that ends on its own. Every field has a foundation to be built, although the supporting structure of that base does not support a straight architecture. Students with a high level of character are believed to be mature enough not to be intimidated by differences or contradictions. Worse, it helped to have the core ideas of anthropology to maintain funding for educational guidance as education reached a more practical end. Domestic noise is shifting to military voices of the past. A bird turns into a machine gun. The sound heard while sitting in a chair incorporates memories into everyday life. Time that seems meaningless can trigger an even past. I think we would agree that an important approach to "established heuristics" is an important argument of Design. But I wonder why you make a normal / irregular difference. How do you explain the complexity of planning when Germany is confronted by the Soviet Union or Serb or Maquee (sp?) Or Brits v. the Boers or, for that matter, some of the LICs involved local insurgents against foreign occupying forces. From 1900 to the present? I choose this time to specifically mention two of your points: If design has the right to a new language that cannot be incorporated into military practice without a very different vocabulary, what does this mean for the concept of strategy? We get? If the problem lies in our reluctance to accept alternative ideas — in their original form, not necessarily the way they are transmitted through organizational doctrine and behavior — are we at risk of forgetting the basics? No? The key to the concept of design is, as the commander-in-chief admiration and campaign design states, the concept involved of complex structures and complex interactive systems. The car is a complex system: closed and detailed, but driven by internal dynamics. On the other hand, cities and social groups are complex interactions. Their dynamics are difficult to produce and characterized by inaccuracy. Criticism of the design of the elevator is that it emphasizes the complexity of the structure at the expense of the interaction complexity. The future is unpredictable, but large-scale third-party state building is rare in American history. However, there are many sanctions missions and gun diplomacy activities. American history is full of maritime forecasting operations and air power for limited completion. It's the Banana War, not Vietnam or Iraq, which is a model for the American war of attrition. As far as the scope of these campaigns relates to the art of operation, they authorize Matheny's ideas about American operations --- joint missions. In the absence of a large-scale stabilization stimulus, could design eventually become an essential tool of operational design, or would it be cut out of the military niche market? Complex arguments occur when basic assumptions are isolated. You mentioned this in your post, saying "... General norms of behavior (in the European Theater of Operations, at least)." That you have to qualify for the Japanese who may not follow the "normal norm" is the kind of cultural contact mirror that needs to be cleaned in every cinema, regardless of whether the enemies there are simple or irregular. That no. We get good at predicting what the enemy will tend to do by investing huge resources and manpower to find it. Something we were not prepared to sacrifice for the rebels. Integrated operations and energy forecasting are the raw materials of the US strategy. Without them, America could not hope for a global operation. It is clear that these types of difficult operations are most at risk by “anti-access” threats in Asia and the Middle East. But are US commanders designing operations and campaigns for more strategies, or is the US just strategizing? Just because they can coordinate large air operations on land does not mean that they will know the political stuff. . Clausewitz defined strategy in a slightly different way, arguing that "[s] strategy is the use of participation for the purpose of war. War. (Jomini acknowledged these considerations as well, but did not incorporate them into the concept of his strategy.) But how does one use engagement for political outcomes? Clausewitz is clear on this point: Search is the mechanism by which victory in battle must be politically motivated. "[W] What remains true under unforeseen circumstances is that no victory will be effective without a pursuit. And no matter how short-lived the exploits of the victory, it must go further than immediate follow-up តិαž…αžួαž… Little positive benefit will be gained in the normal course of events unless the victory ends with a chase on the first day. . ”[Vii] Is the nature of the strategy acceptable to the concept of intervention? The art of operating for all the good it did in the beginning to re-emphasize the practical and skillful conduct of war may be its process and should be folded into both minds. That preceded its development. But the ancient house of the performing arts is not strategic, but strategic. In fact, a general definition of the most appropriate strategy that the art of operation could be offered, despite his operating style bias, by Liddell Hart: "The art of distribution and the application of military means to achieve the end of policy. ". «αž‘αž„់αž‡ាតិαž“េះ ដែαž›αž™ើαž„αž‚ោαžšαž– αž“ិαž„αž€្រោαž˜αž€ាαžšαž”αž˜្រើ αž‚ឺαž‡ាαž“ិមិត្តរូαž”αž“ៃαž―αž€αž—ាαž– ធំណាαž…αžšαž”αžŸ់αž™ើαž„ αž‚ំαž“ិត αž“ិαž„αž‚ោαž›αž”ំαžŽαž„αžšαž”αžŸ់αž™ើαž„αž€្αž“ុαž„αž“ាαž˜αž‡ាតិសាαžŸαž“៍មួαž™។ វា​αž‚្មាαž“​αž›αž€្ខណៈ​ធ្វី​αž€្រៅ​αž–ី​ធ្វី​ដែαž›​αž™ើαž„​αž•្αžαž›់​ឲ្αž™​វា​αž–ី​មួαž™​αž‡ំαž“ាαž“់​αž‘ៅ​មួαž™​αž‡ំαž“ាαž“់​αž“ោះ​αž‘េ។ αž‡αž˜្រើαžŸαž‚ឺαž‡ាαžšαž”αžŸ់αž™ើαž„។ វា​ធណ្តែត​αž€្αž“ុαž„​αž—ាαž–​ស្αž„ៀមស្αž„ាត់​ដ៏​ធស្αž…ារ្αž™​αž“ៅ​αž–ី​αž›ើ​ម្αž…ាស់αž•្αž‘ះ ដែαž›​αž”្រតិαž”αž្តិ​αž‡αž˜្រើស​αž‘ាំαž„​αž“ោះ αž‘ោះ​αž€្αž“ុαž„​αžŸαž“្តិαž—ាαž– ឬ​αž€្αž“ុαž„​αžŸαž„្αž‚្រាម​αž€៏ដោαž™។ ហើαž™αž‘ោះαž”ីαž‡ាαž“ៅស្αž„ៀαž˜αž€៏ដោαž™ វាαž“ិαž™ាαž™αž˜αž€αž€ាαž“់αž™ើαž„ — αž“ិαž™ាαž™αž‘ៅαž€ាαž“់αž™ើαž„αž–ីធតីαžαž€ាαž› αž¬αž”ុរស αž“ិαž„αžŸ្ត្រីដែαž›αž”ាαž“αž‘ៅមុαž“αž™ើαž„ αž“ិαž„αž’ំαž–ីαž€ំណត់ត្រាដែαž›αž–ួαž€αž‚េαž”ាαž“αžŸαžšαžŸេαžšαž“ៅαž›ើវា»។ វាαž‚ឺαž‡ាαž€ាαžšαž…ាαž”់αž•្តើαž˜αž“ៃαž€ាαžšαž’្វើដំណើរដើម្αž”ីαž›ាតត្រដាαž„αž–ីαžšαž”ួសដែαž›αž’ាαž…αž˜ើαž›αžƒើαž‰ αž“ិαž„αž˜ើαž›αž˜ិαž“αžƒើαž‰αžšαž”αžŸ់ធតីαžαž™ុαž‘្αž’αž‡αž“ αž“ិαž„αžŠើម្αž”ីស្វែαž„αž™αž›់αž–ីαž‚ំαž“ិαžαžšαž”αžŸ់ខ្αž‰ុំαž•្αž‘ាαž›់ធំαž–ីធ្វីដែαž›αžŸαž„្រ្αž‚ាαž˜αž’្វើαž…ំαž–ោះរាαž„αž€ាαž™ αž‚ំαž“ិαžαžšαž”αžŸ់αž–ួαž€αž‚េ αž“ិαž„αž…ំαž–ោះαž˜αž“ុស្αžŸαž‡ាតិαžšαž”αžŸ់αž–ួαž€αž‚េ។ "αž€ារឈ្αž›ាαž“αž–ាαž“αžšαž”αžŸ់αž‡αž“αž‡ាតិαž–ែរ្αžŸαž…ូαž›αž‘ៅαž€្αž“ុαž„αž”្αžšαž‘េαžŸαž€្រិαž… αž€ាαžšαž”្αžšαžˆαž˜αž“ឹαž„αžŸαžŽ្តាαž”់αž’្αž“ាαž”់ធ៊ឺរ៉ុαž”αžŠោαž™αž”αžŠិវត្αžαž“៍αž”ារាំαž„ αž“ិαž„αžាαž˜αž–αž›αžŠ៏αž‡្រុαž›αž“ិαž™αž˜αžŠែαž›αžœាαž”ាαž“αž”αž‰្αž…េαž‰ αž€ាαžšαž‡αž‡ែαž€αžœែαž€αž‰ែαž€αž•្αž“ែαž€αžŸαž“្តិសុαžαž“ៃαž‘αžŸαžœαž្សរ៍αž†្αž“ាំ 1920 αž“ិαž„ 30 αžŸαž„្រ្αž‚ាមត្αžšαž‡ាαž€់αžŸαž€αž›αž្រូαžœαž”ាαž“αž…ាត់αž‘ុαž€αžាαž‡ាαž–្រឹត្តិαž€ារណ៍ដ៏ស្មុαž‚αžŸ្មាαž‰αž្αž–αžŸ់ដែαž›αž”ំαž•្αž›ាαž‰αž€ាαžšαž‚ិαžαž”ែαž”αž…ាស់។ ហើαž™αž”ាαž“αž•្αž›ាស់αž”្តូαžšαž…ំណុαž…αž‡ាមូαž›αžŠ្αž‹ាαž“αž“ៃសេαž…αž€្តីαž™ោαž„។ αž”ើαž”្រៀαž”αž’ៀαž”αž‘ៅαž“ឹαž„αž–្រឹត្តិαž€ារណ៍αž‘ីតាαž“ិαž€αž‘ាំαž„αž“េះ វាαž–ិαžαž‡ាធាαž…αž“ិαž™ាαž™αž”ាαž“αžាαž†្αž“ាំ 1991-2012 មាαž“αž€ាαžšαž”្រែαž”្រួαž›αž”្រហាαž€់αž”្រហែαž›αž‚្αž“ាαž“ឹαž„αž€ាαžšαž’ាαž“ាឱ្αž™αž˜ាαž“αž€ាαžšαž‚ិតទើαž„αžœិαž‰αž’ំαž–ីវិαž’ីដែαž›αž™ើαž„αžšៀαž”αž…ំαž•ែαž“αž€ាαžšαž”្រតិαž”αž្តិαž€ារ αž“ិαž„αž™ុαž‘្αž’αž“ាαž€ារ?" តើធ្វីαž‡ាαž›αž€្ខណៈαž“ៃαž™ុαž‘្αž’αžŸាស្ត្រ? αž‚ំαž“ិαžαž™ុαž‘្αž’αžŸាស្រ្តសហសម័αž™αž‡ាαž‘ូαž‘ៅដាαž€់វាαž“ៅαž€αž˜្រិαžαž‚ោαž›αž“αž™ោαž”ាαž™។ αž›ោαž€ David Jablonsky αž‚ឺαž‡ាតួαž™៉ាαž„αž€្αž“ុαž„αž€ាαžšαž•្αžαž›់αž™ោαž”αž›់ថា "[t] αž€αž˜្រិαžαž™ុαž‘្αž’αžŸាស្ត្αžšαžšαž”αžŸ់αž‚ាត់αž‚ឺមាαž“αž—ាαž–αž›េαž…αž’្αž›ោαž“ៅαž€្αž“ុαž„αž€ាαžšαž”αž“្αžαž“ៃαžŸαž„្រ្αž‚ាម αž–ីαž–្រោះ ដូαž…αžŠែαž›αž™ើαž„αž”ាαž“αž€αž់សម្αž‚ាαž›់ វាαž“ៅαž‘ីαž“េះដែαž›αž‚ោαž›αžŠៅαž“αž™ោαž”ាαž™αž“ៃαžŸαž„្រ្αž‚ាមត្រូαžœαž”ាαž“αž€ំណត់។"[i] αž€ាαžšαž”αž€αžŸ្រាαž™αž“ៃαž™ុαž‘្αž’αžŸាស្រ្αžαž“េះ αž•αž›ិαžαž•αž›αž˜ួαž™។ αž“ៃαžŸαž„្αž‚្រាមត្αžšαž‡ាαž€់ αž“ិαž„αž€ាαžšαž˜αž€αžŠαž›់αž“ៃធាវុαž’αž“ុαž™αž€្αž›េធ៊ែ αž‚ឺαž‡ារឿαž„αž្មីមួαž™αž“ៅαž€្αž“ុαž„αž”្រវត្តិសាស្ត្αžšαž“ៃαž‚ំαž“ិαžαž™ុαž‘្αž’αžŸាស្ត្រ។ αž‘ោះαž‡ាαž™៉ាαž„αžŽាαž€៏ដោαž™ ធ្វីមួαž™αžŠែαž›αž’ាαž…αž”្αžšαž€ែαž€αž”ាαž“αž្រូαžœαž”ាαž“αž”ាត់αž”αž„់αž…ាαž”់តាំαž„αž–ីαž™ុαž‘្αž’αžŸាស្ត្រ—αž§αž”αž€αžšαžŽ៍សំខាαž“់αžšαž”αžŸ់αž™ើαž„αžŠែαž›αž˜ាαž“αžŸαž˜αž្αžαž—ាαž–αž’ាαž…αž±្αž™αž™ើαž„αž™αž›់ធំαž–ីαžŸαž„្αž‚្រាម—ត្រូαžœαž”ាαž“αž€ំណត់ទើαž„αžœិαž‰αžាαž˜αžšαž”ៀαž”αž“េះ។[ii] ខ្αž‰ុំαž™αž›់ស្αžšαž”αž‡ាមួαž™αž’្αž“αž€αžាαž”αžšិαž™ាαž€ាស αž‘ំαž“ើαž” αž‚ឺស្មុαž‚αžŸ្មាαž‰αž‡ាαž„αžŸαž˜្រាαž”់ហេតុαž•αž›αžŠែαž›αž’្αž“αž€αž”ាαž“αž›ើαž€αž‘ើαž„។ αž‘ោះαž™៉ាαž„αžŽាαž€៏ដោαž™ ខ្αž‰ុំមាαž“αž€ាαžšαž”្រុαž„αž”្αžšαž™័ត្αž“αž”្αžšαž†ាំαž„αž“ឹαž„αž€ាαžšαž’្វើឱ្αž™αž˜ាαž“αž—ាαž–αžុαžŸαž‚្αž“ារវាαž„ LIC αž“ិαž„αž€ាαžšαž”្αžšαž™ុαž‘្αž’ "សាαž˜αž‰្αž‰" ។ αž–ាαž€្αž™αž“ៃαž€ាαžšαž”αžšាαž‡័αž™αžិαž…αžួαž…αž“ៅαž€្αž“ុαž„αž€ាαžšαž”្αžšαž™ុαž‘្αž’αž’αž˜្មតាធាαž…αž‚្រាαž“់តែαž‡ាαž€ារខូαž…αžាαžαž•្αž“ែαž€αž“αž™ោαž”ាαž™ αž“ិαž„αžšំខាαž“αžŠαž›់αž™ុαž‘្αž’αžŸាស្ត្រតាαž˜αžšαž™ៈធ៊ីαž“αž’ឺណិαžαž‡ាដើម ដូαž…αž‡ា Tet តាαž˜αžšαž™ៈαž‘ូαžšαž‘αžŸ្αžŸαž“៍/αž€្រដាស ឬ Abu Ghraib ។ សម្រាαž”់αž‚ោαž›αž”ំαžŽαž„αž“ៃαž€ាαžšαž‡αž‡ែαž€αžœែαž€αž‰ែαž€ αž§αž”αž˜ាថាធ្αž“αž€αž‡ំαž“ាαž‰αž•្αž“ែαž€αž”្រតិαž”αž្តិαž€ាαžšαž™αž›់αž–្αžšαž˜αž›ើធ្វីដែαž›αž‡ាសិαž›្αž”ៈαž”្រតិαž”αž្តិαž€ារ។ αž”៉ុαž“្តែតើវាαž…ាαž”់αž•្តើαž˜αž“ៅαž–េαž›αžŽា? Martin Van Creveld αž“ិαž„ Claus Telp αž‘ាំαž„αž–ីαžšαž”ាαž“αžŠាαž€់αž…េαž‰αž“ូαžœαžŸαž„្αž‚្រាαž˜αž”្រតិαž”αž្តិαž€ាαžšαž‡ាαž“ិαž“្αž“ាαž€ារមួαž™αžŠែαž›αž˜ាαž“αžŠើαž˜αž€ំណើតណាαž”៉ូទេធុαž„αž™៉ាαž„αž‘ូαž›ំαž‘ូαž›ាαž™។ ធ្αž“αž€αž“ិαž–αž“្αž’αž•្សេαž„αž‘ៀតដូαž…αž‡ា Schneider αž•្តោαžαž›ើαž€αž‰្αž…αž€់αž”្រតិαž”αž្តិαž€ាαžšαžšαž”αžŸ់αž–ួαž€αž‚េαž†្αž–ោះαž‘ៅαž–ាαž€់αž€αžŽ្តាαž›αžŸαžαžœαž្αžŸαž‘ី 19 αž¬αž€្រោαž™។ αž”្រវត្តិαž”្រតិαž”αž្តិαž€ាαžšαž—ាαž‚αž…្រើαž“αž€៏αž—ាαž‚αž…្រើαž“αž˜ិαž“αž’ើαž–ើαž“ឹαž„αž™ុαž‘្αž’αž“ាαž€ាαžšαž€αž„αž‘័αž–αž‡ើαž„αž‘ឹαž€ αž“ិαž„αž•្αž›ូវធាαž€ាស ដោαž™αž˜ិαž“αž“ិαž™ាαž™αž’្វីធំαž–ីធាវុαž’αžូαž…។ αž”្រសិαž“αž”ើសិαž›្αž”ៈαž”្រតិαž”αžិ្αžαž€ាαžšαž‚ឺαž‡ាαž•αž›ិαžαž•αž›αž“ៃαž”αžŠិវត្αžαž“៍ឧស្សាαž αž€αž˜្ម វាαž–ិαž”ាαž€αž€្αž“ុαž„αž€ាαžšαž”αž„្ហាαž‰αž’ំαž–ីαž—ាαž–αž្រឹមត្រូαžœαž“ៃαž€ាαžšαž•្តោαžαž›ើαžŸαž„្រ្αž‚ាមដែαž›αž‚្αžšαž”αžŠαžŽ្αžαž”់ដោαž™αžŸαž€αž˜្αž˜αž—ាαž–αž’αž„្αž‚αž—ាαž–αžូαž…αŸ—αžšαžœាαž„αž‘័αž–αž–្រៃ αž“ិαž„αž្មើαžšαž‡ើαž„។ αž—ាαž–αž›ំធៀαž„αž‘្វីαž”αž“ៃធ្αž“αž€αž‘្រឹស្តីαž”្រតិαž”αžិ្αžαž€ាαžšαž€៏αž–αžŽ៌αž‘ៅαž›ើαž€ាαžšαž’្វេαžŸαž”្រហែαžŸαž“ៃαžŸαž„្αž‚្រាαž˜αž‘័αž–αž‡ើαž„αž‘ឹαž€ αž“ិαž„αž€αž˜្αž›ាំαž„αž‘័αž–αž’ាαž€ាαžŸαž•αž„αžŠែរ។ This type of data sharing can be considered a "sale" of information under the California Privacy Act. αž€ាαžšαž”ិαž‘αž€ាαžšαž•្សាαž™αž–ាណិαž‡្αž‡αž€αž˜្αž˜αž•្αž‘ាαž›់ខ្αž›ួαž“αž“ឹαž„αž’្វើឱ្αž™αž’្αž“αž€αž…េαž‰αž–ី "αž€ាαžšαž›αž€់" αž‘ាំαž„αž“េះ។ Find out more about our Privacy Policy, Help Center and Cookies and our similar technology policies. ថ្αž„ៃαž›ិαž…αž‡ាαž€់ស្តែαž„αžšαž”αžŸ់ Counterinsurgency αž”ាαž“αž’្វើឱ្αž™αž™ោαž’ាមាαž“αž€ារតស៊ូសម្រាαž”់αž”េαžŸαž€αž€αž˜្មថ្មី αž”៉ុαž“្តែវាαž“ឹαž„αž˜ាαž“αžŸិαž›្αž”ៈαž”្រតិαž”αž្តិαž€ាαžšαž‡ាαž“ិαž…្αž…។ αž“ៅαž–េαž›αžŠែαž›αžœាαž›αžšαž„αžŠែαž›αž‚្αžšαž”់αž‚្αžšαž„αžŠោαž™αž’្αž“αž€αž―αž€αž‘េαžŸαž€្αž“ុαž„αž”្រវត្តិសាស្ត្រសូវៀត αž“ិαž„αž’ាទឺម៉αž„់ αž‚ោαž›αž›αž‘្αž’ិ αž“ិαž„αžœោហាសាស្ត្រធំαž–ីαž€ាαžšαžšαž…αž“ាαž”្រតិαž”αž្តិαž€ារ αž“ិαž„αž™ុαž‘្αž’αž“ាαž€ារឈាαž“αžŠαž›់αž…ំណុαž…αž€ំαž–ូαž›αžšαž”αžŸ់ខ្αž›ួαž“αž“ៅαž€្αž“ុαž„αžŸ្ថេαžšαž—ាαž–αžŠ៏αž’ំ αž“ិαž„αž”េαžŸαž€αž€αž˜្αž˜αž€αžŸាαž„αžšαžŠ្αž‹។ αž€ាαžšαž‡αž‡ែαž€αžœែαž€αž‰ែαž€αž’ំαž–ីαž€ាαžšαžšαž…αž“ាមាαž“αž—ាαž–αžŸ្រដៀαž„αž‚្αž“ាαž‘ៅαž“ឹαž„αž€ារឈ្αž›ោះαž”្αžšαž€ែαž€αž‚្αž“ាαž›ើαž’αž€្សរសាស្ត្រ "canon" αž“ៅαž€្αž“ុαž„αž˜αž“ុស្αžŸαž‡ាតិαž€្αž“ុαž„αž€ំទុαž„αž‘αžŸαžœαž្សរ៍αž†្αž“ាំ 1980 αž‘ោះαž”ីαž‡ាមាαž“αž€ាαžšαž”ែαž„αž…ែαž€αž™៉ាαž„αž‡្រាαž›αž‡្រៅរវាαž„αž€ាαžšαž”្αžšαž™ុαž‘្αž’αž‚្αž“ាαž“ិαž„αž€ាαžšαž‡αž‡ែαž€αžœែαž€αž‰ែαž€αž’ំαž–ី Roland Barthes αž“ិαž„ "សេαž…αž€្តីរីαž€αžšាαž™αž“ៃធត្αžαž”αž‘" αž€៏ដោαž™។ ធ្αž“αž€αž”្αžšαž–ៃណីដូαž…αž‡ា Harold Bloom αž”ាαž“αž‡ឿαž‡ាαž€់αž™៉ាαž„αž˜ុតមាំαž›ើ Canon αž“ិαž„αžŸារៈសំខាαž“់αž“ៃαž€ាαžšαžšαž€្សាαž“ូវស្αž“ូαž›αž“ៃαž”្αžšαž–ៃណីដែαž›αž…្រើαž“αž¬αžិαž…αž˜ិαž“αž’ាαž…αž•្αž›ាស់αž”្តូαžšαž”ាαž“។ ធ្αž“αž€αžŸិαž€្សាαž”αžŠិវត្αžαž€ាαž“់តែαž…្រើαž“αž…αž„់αž•្តួαž›αžšំαž›ំ Canon αž“េះ αž”្αžšαž‡ែαž„αž“ឹαž„αžួαžšαž›េខឈាαž“αž˜ុαžαž‚េ αž“ិαž„αžŠោះស្រាαž™αž”αž‰្ហាαž€ាαžšαžŸαž“្មត់αž“ៃមេរោαž‚αžŠែαž›αžœាត្រូαžœαž”ាαž“αž”αž„្αž€ើតទើαž„។ αž—ាαž‚ីαž‘ាំαž„αžŸαž„αžាαž„αž˜ិαž“αž…ាំαž”ាαž…់ឈ្αž“ះαž‘ាំαž„αžŸ្រុαž„αž“ោះαž‘េ។ Canon ត្រូវ​αž”ាαž“​αž–αž„្រីαž€​ដើម្αž”ី​រួម​αž”αž‰្αž…ូαž›​ធ្αž“αž€​αž“ិαž–αž“្αž’​αž…αž˜្រុះ​αž€ាαž“់​តែ​αž…្រើαž“ αž“ិαž„​αž”αž‰្αž‡ាαž€់​ធំαž–ី​វិαž’ី​សាស្ត្រ​ដែαž›​សំខាαž“់​αž‡ាαž„​មុαž“​αž€្αž“ុαž„​αž€ារ​សិαž€្សា​αž’αž€្សរសិαž›្αž”៍។ វាαž–ិαž”ាαž€αž€្αž“ុαž„αž€ាαžšαž‡αž‡ែαž€αžœែαž€αž‰ែαž€αž”្αžšαž†ាំαž„αž“ឹαž„αž€ារឈ្αž›ោះαž”្αžšαž€ែαž€αž‚្αž“ាដែαž›αž’្αž“αž€αž“ិαž–αž“្αž’αž˜ួαž™αž…ំαž“ួαž“αž្រូαžœαž”ាαž“αž‚េមើαž›αžšំαž›αž„αžŠោαž™αž’αž™ុត្តិαž’αž˜៌ ហើαž™αžœិαž’ីសាស្រ្αžαž“ៃαž€ារស៊ើαž”αž’αž„្αž€េតមួαž™αž…ំαž“ួαž“αž”ាαž“αž‡αž˜្រះαž‘ាំαž„αžŸ្រុαž„αž“ូαžœαž…αž“្αž›ោះαž”្រហោαž„αž“ៃαž‚ំαž“ិត។ αž€ារឈ្αž›ាαž“αž–ាαž“αžšαž”αžŸ់αž‡αž“αž‡ាតិαž–ែរ្αžŸαž…ូαž›αž‘ៅαž€្αž“ុαž„αž”្αžšαž‘េαžŸαž€្រិαž… αž€ាαžšαž”្αžšαžˆαž˜αž“ឹαž„αžŸαžŽ្តាαž”់αž’្αž“ាαž”់ធ៊ឺរ៉ុαž”αžŠោαž™αž”αžŠិវត្αžαž“៍αž”ារាំαž„ αž“ិαž„αžាαž˜αž–αž›αžŠែαž›αž“ិαž™αž˜αž‡្រុαž›αžŠែαž›αžœាαž”ាαž“αž”αž‰្αž…េαž‰ αž€ាαžšαž‡αž‡ែαž€αžœែαž€αž‰ែαž€αž•្αž“ែαž€αžŸαž“្តិសុαžαž“ៃαž‘αžŸαžœαž្សរ៍αž†្αž“ាំ 1920 αž“ិαž„ 30 αžŸαž„្αž‚្រាមត្αžšαž‡ាαž€់αžŸαž€αž›αž្រូαžœαž”ាαž“αž…ាត់αž‘ុαž€αžាαž‡ាαž–្រឹត្តិαž€ារណ៍ដ៏ស្មុαž‚αžŸ្មាαž‰αž្αž–αžŸ់ដែαž›αž”ំαž•្αž›ាαž‰αž€ាαžšαž‚ិαžαž”ែαž”αž…ាស់ αž“ិαž„ αž”ាαž“αž•្αž›ាស់αž”្តូαžšαž…ំណុαž…αž™ោαž„αž‡ាមូαž›αžŠ្αž‹ាαž“។ αž”ើαž”្រៀαž”αž’ៀαž”αž‘ៅαž“ឹαž„αž–្រឹត្តិαž€ារណ៍αž‘ីតាαž“ិαž€αž‘ាំαž„αž“េះ តើវាαž–ិαžαž‡ាធាαž…αž“ិαž™ាαž™αž”ាαž“αžាαž†្αž“ាំ 1991-2012 មាαž“αž€ាαžšαž•្αž›ាស់αž”្តូរស្រដៀαž„αž‚្αž“ាαž‘ៅαž“ឹαž„αž€ាαžšαž’ាαž“ាឱ្αž™αž˜ាαž“αž€ាαžšαž‚ិតទើαž„αžœិαž‰αž’ំαž–ីវិαž’ីដែαž›αž™ើαž„αžšៀαž”αž…ំαž•ែαž“αž€ាαžšαž”្រតិαž”αž្តិαž€ារ αž“ិαž„αž™ុαž‘្αž’αž“ាαž€ារដែαžšαž¬αž‘េ? ថ្αž„ៃαž›ិαž… (សម្រាαž”់αž–េαž›αž“េះ) αž“ៃαž€ាαžšαž”្αžšαž†ាំαž„αž€ាαžšαž”ះαž”ោαžšαž“ៅធ៊ីរ៉ាαž€់ αž“ិαž„αž’ាហ្វហ្αž‚ាαž“ីស្ថាαž“ αž”αž„្ហាαž‰αž’្αž“αž€αž’αž“ុវត្αžαž€ាαžšαžšαž…αž“ាαž‡ាមួαž™αž“ឹαž„αž”αž‰្ហាαž”្រឈម αž“ិαž„αž±αž€ាសមួαž™។ តើαž€ាαžšαžšαž…αž“ាαž“ឹαž„αžŸαž˜្αžšαž”αž្αž›ួαž“αž‘ៅαž“ឹαž„αž”αžšិαž”αž‘αž™ុαž‘្αž’αžŸាស្ត្រ αž“ិαž„αž—ូមិសាស្ត្αžšαž“αž™ោαž”ាαž™αžŠែαž›αž”ាαž“αž•្αž›ាស់αž”្តូαžšαž“ៃαž”្រតិαž”αž្តិαž€ារធាមេរិαž€αžŠែαžšαž¬αž‘េ? ឬតើវាαž“ឹαž„αž€្αž›ាαž™αž‡ាαž”្αžšαž‘េαžŸαž€្រៅαž–ិαž—αž–αž“ៃ "αž”្រតិαž”αž្តិαž€ាαžšαž€្រៅαž–ីαžŸαž„្រ្αž‚ាម" αž”េαžŸαž€αž€αž˜្αž˜αž”្រឹαž€្សា αž“ិαž„αž”αžŽ្តុះαž”αžŽ្តាαž› αž“ិαž„αž”្រតិαž”αž្តិαž€ាαžšαž™ោαž’ា? αž…αž˜្αž›ើαž™​αž‚ឺ​ធាស្រ័αž™​αž™៉ាαž„​αž‡ាαž€់αž›ាαž€់​αž‘ៅ​αž›ើ​ធ្វី​ដែαž›​αž€ំណត់​ថា​αž‡ា “αžšαž…αž“ា”។ វាαž…្αž”ាស់ណាស់ថាαž‚ំαž“ិαžαž“ៃαž™ុαž‘្αž’αžŸាស្ត្αžšαžšαž”αžŸ់ Jomini មាαž“αžŸ្រាαž”់ដើម្αž”ីαž”ើαž€αž€ាαžšαž”្αžšαž™ុαž‘្αž’។ αž€ាαžšαž”្αžšαž™ុαž‘្αž’αžŠ៏αž‡ោαž‚αž‡័αž™αž‚ឺαž‡ាαžšαž„្វាαž“់αž“ៃαž™ុαž‘្αž’αžŸាស្ត្រដ៏αž›្ធ។ αž€ាαžšαž”αž€αžŸ្រាαž™αž’ំαž–ីαž™ុαž‘្αž’αžŸាស្ត្αžšαž”ែαž”αž“េះធាαž…αž‡ាαž•αž›αžœិαž”ាαž€αž“ៃαž”αž‘αž–ិសោαž’αž“៍αžšαž”αžŸ់αž‚ាត់αž€្αž“ុαž„αž“ាαž˜αž‡ាαž”ុαž‚្αž‚αž›ិαž€αž˜្αž“ាαž€់ដែαž›αž”ាαž“αž’្វើαž€ាαžšαž‘ាំαž„αž“ៅαž€្αž“ុαž„αž‘ីស្αž“ាαž€់αž€ាαžšαž€αžŽ្តាαž›αžšαž”αžŸ់ Marshal Ney αž“ិαž„ Napoleon ហើαž™αž“ៅαž‘ីαž”ំαž•ុαžαž”ាαž“αž‘ើαž„αž€្αž›ាαž™αž‡ាαž”្αžšαž’ាαž“αž”ុαž‚្αž‚αž›ិαž€αžšαž”αžŸ់ Ney ។ αž‚ាត់αž“ឹαž„αž្រូαžœαž”ាαž“αž‚េដាαž€់αž™៉ាαž„αž›្αž’αž€្αž“ុαž„αž€ាαžšαž™αž›់αžƒើαž‰ αž“ិαž„αž™αž›់ធំαž–ីαž…ំαž“ួαž“αž€ាαžšαž„ារដែαž›αž…ាំαž”ាαž…់ដើម្αž”ីឈាαž“αž‘ៅαžŠαž›់αžŸαž˜αžšαž—ូមិαž€្αž“ុαž„αž‘αž˜្αžšαž„់αž”្αžšαž™ុαž‘្αž’។ ដោαž™αž”ាαž“αžŽែαž“ាំαž–ីαž‚ំαž“ិαžαž’αž“្តរាαž‚αž˜αž“៍រវាαž„αž™ុαž‘្αž’αžŸាស្ត្រ αž“ិαž„αž™ុαž‘្αž’αžŸាស្ត្រ Svechin αž”ាαž“αž€ំណត់សិαž›្αž”ៈαž”្រតិαž”αž្តិαž€ាαžšαž€្αž“ុαž„αž›αž€្ខណៈ Jominian ។ αž‘ោះαž‡ាαž™៉ាαž„αžŽាαž€៏ដោαž™ Svechin αž‚ឺαž‡ាធ្αž“αž€αž”្រាαž‡្αž‰αžšαž”αžŸ់ Clausewitz ដែαž›αž”ាαž“αžŸαžšαžŸេαžšαž€ារសិαž€្សាធំαž–ីαž”ុαžšαžŸαž“ិαž„αž€ាαžšαž„ាαžšαžšαž”αžŸ់αž‚ាត់ដែαž›αž˜ិαž“αž‘ាαž“់ត្រូαžœαž”ាαž“αž”αž€αž”្រែαž‡ាαž—ាសាαž’αž„់αž‚្αž›េស។ αž‚ាត់​αž”ាαž“​αž€ំណត់​αž™ុαž‘្αž’αžŸាស្ត្រ​ដោαž™​សមហេតុαž•αž› αž‘ោះαž”ី​មិαž“​សុαž‘្αž’αžŸាαž’​αž€៏ដោαž™​តាម​វិαž’ី Clausewitzian។ “αž™ុαž‘្αž’αžŸាស្ត្αžšαž‚ឺαž‡ាសិαž›្αž”ៈαž“ៃαž€ាαžšαž”αž‰្αž…ូαž›αž‚្αž“ាαž“ូαžœαž€ាររៀαž”αž…ំសម្រាαž”់αžŸαž„្αž‚្រាម αž“ិαž„αž€ាαžšαž…ាត់αž‡ាαž€្រុαž˜αž“ៃαž”្រតិαž”αž្តិαž€ារដើម្αž”ីសម្រេαž…αž”ាαž“αž“ូαžœαž‚ោαž›αžŠៅដែαž›αž”ាαž“αž€ំណត់ដោαž™αžŸαž„្αž‚្រាមសម្រាαž”់αž€αž„αž€αž˜្αž›ាំαž„αž”្រដាαž”់ធាវុαž’។ αž™ុαž‘្αž’αžŸាស្ត្αžšαž€ំណត់αž”αž‰្ហាដែαž›αž‘ាαž€់αž‘αž„αž“ឹαž„αž€ាαžšαž„ាαžšαžšαž”αžŸ់αž€αž„αž€αž˜្αž›ាំαž„αž”្រដាαž”់ធាវុαž’ αž“ិαž„αž’αž“αž’ាαž“αž‘ាំαž„αž’αžŸ់αžšαž”αžŸ់αž”្αžšαž‘េសមួαž™αžŸαž˜្រាαž”់αž€ារសម្រេαž…αž”ាαž“αž“ូαžœαž‚ោαž›αž”ំαžŽαž„αž“ៃαžŸαž„្αž‚្រាαž˜αž…ុαž„αž€្រោαž™… ធ្αž“αž€αž™ុαž‘្αž’αžŸាស្រ្αžαž“ឹαž„αž‘αž‘ួαž›αž”ាαž“αž‡ោαž‚αž‡័αž™ αž”្រសិαž“αž”ើαž‚ាត់វាαž™αžαž˜្αž›ៃαž™៉ាαž„αž្រឹមត្រូវធំαž–ីαž’αž˜្αž˜αž‡ាតិαž“ៃαžŸαž„្αž‚្រាម ដែαž›αž’ាស្រ័αž™αž›ើសេដ្αž‹αž€ិαž…្αž… αžŸαž„្αž‚αž˜ αž—ូមិសាស្រ្ត រដ្αž‹αž”ាαž›αž•្សេαž„αŸ—αž‚្αž“ា។ αž“ិαž„αž€αž្តាαž”αž…្αž…េαž€αž‘េស។” [xii] តម្αž›ៃαž›αž€់ AU$44.74 ៀៀ,៧ៀ ដុαž›្αž›ារធូស្ត្រាαž›ី សម្រាαž”់ Clausewitz αž™ុαž‘្αž’αžŸាស្រ្αžαž…ាαž”់αž•្តើαž˜αž‡ាមួαž™αž“ឹαž„αž€ាαžšαž”្αžšαž™ុαž‘្αž’។ αžŸαž˜αžšαž—ូមិαž‚ឺαž‡ាមូαž›αžŠ្αž‹ាαž“αž“ៃαž™ុαž‘្αž’αžŸាស្ត្រ។ αž€ាαžšαž”αž€αžŸ្រាαž™αž“ៃαž™ុαž‘្αž’αžŸាស្រ្αžαž”ែαž”αž“េះαž”្រហែαž›αž‡ាត្រូαžœαž”ាαž“αž’αž—ិវឌ្αžαž™៉ាαž„αž›្αž’αž–ីαž”αž‘αž–ិសោαž’αž“៍αžšαž”αžŸ់ Prussia αž€្αž“ុαž„αž†្αž“ាំ 1805 ។ αž€αž„αž‘័αž–αžšαž”αžŸ់វាត្រូαžœαž”ាαž“αž…ាαž‰់αž™៉ាαž„αžŠាαž…់αž’αž αž„្αž€ាαžšαž“ៅ Jena-Auerstedt αž”αž“្αž‘ាαž”់αž–ីαž“ោះណាαž”៉ូទេធុαž„αž”ាαž“αž”αž“្αžαž€ាαžšαž”ាαž€់αž”ែαž€αžšαž”αžŸ់ខ្αž›ួαž“αž‘ៅαž€ាαž“់សមុαž‘្αžšαž”ាαž›់αž‘ិαž€ ហើαž™αž”ាαž“αžŠαžŽ្តើαž˜αž™αž€αž‘ីαž€្រុαž„αž”៊ែរទាំαž„αž€្αž“ុαž„αžŠំណើαžšαž€ាαžšαž“េះ។ Clausewitz αž‡ឿថា αž€ាαžšαž’្វើαžŸαž„្αž‚្រាαž˜αžšαž”αžŸ់ណាαž”៉ូទេធុαž„ មាαž“αž“័αž™αžា αž™ុαž‘្αž’αž“ាαž€ាαžšαž€αž˜្αžšαž“ឹαž„αž€ើតមាαž“αž”αž“្αž‘ាαž”់αž–ីαž€ាαžšαž”្αžšαž™ុαž‘្αž’αžŠ៏សំខាαž“់ សម្រាαž”់αž€ារស្វែαž„αžšαž€αžŠោαž™αž₯αžαžˆαž”់αžˆαžšαž“ឹαž„αž“ាំαž‘ៅαžšαž€αžŸαž“្តិαž—ាαž–αžាαž˜αž›αž€្ខខណ្αžŒαžšαž”αžŸ់αž‚ាត់។ ធាហ្វហ្αž‚ាαž“ីស្ថាαž“αž‚ឺស្មុαž‚αžŸ្មាαž‰αž‘ាំαž„αžšαž…αž“ាសម្αž–័αž“្αž’ αž“ិαž„αž’αž“្αžαžšαžŸαž€αž˜្ម។ αž™ុαž‘្αž’αž“ាαž€ារ Normandy αž€៏ដូαž…αž‚្αž“ាដែរ។ αž€ាαžšαž…ាαž€់αž”αž‰្αž…ូαž›αž€αž˜្αž›ាំαž„αž‘ៅαž€្αž“ុαž„αž‘្វីαž”αž’ឺរ៉ុαž”αž‚ឺαž‡ាαž€ារខិតខំαž”្រឹαž„αž”្រែαž„αž˜ួαž™αžŠែαž›αž្រូαžœαž”ាαž“αž…ាαž€់αž«αžŸαž“ៅαž€្αž“ុαž„αž”αž‰្ហាαž’αž“្αžαžšαžŸαž€αž˜្មខាαž„αž“αž™ោαž”ាαž™ αž™ោαž’ា αž“ិαž„αž”αž‰្ហាαž”្រតិαž”αž្តិαž€ារ។ αž”αž‰្ហាαž‘ាំαž„αž’αžŸ់αž“េះ - αž–ីធាαž€ាαžŸαž’ាតុរហូαžαžŠαž›់αž•αž›αž”៉ះαž–ាαž›់αž“αž™ោαž”ាαž™αž“ៃធ្αž“αž€αžŠែαž›αž“ឹαž„αž‚្αžšαž”់αž‚្αžšαž„αž”្αžšαž‘េαžŸαž”ារាំαž„αž€្រោαž™αžŸαž„្αž‚្រាម - មាαž“αž”αž“្αž‘ុαž€αž›ើαž€ាαžšαžšαž…αž“ាαž“ៃαž™ុαž‘្αž’αž“ាαž€ាαžšαž“េះ។ αž‡ាαž‘ូαž‘ៅ αžŸαž„្αž‚្រាαž˜αž›ោαž€αž›ើαž€αž‘ី 2 αž›េαž…αž‘ើαž„αžែαž€្αž“ុαž„αž€ាររៀαž”αž…ំទើαž„αžœិαž‰αž”៉ុណ្ណោះ។ αž€ាαžšαž‡αž‡ែαž€αžœែαž€αž‰ែαž€αž•្αž‘ៃαž€្αž“ុαž„αžšαž”αžŸ់αž’αž„់αž‚្αž›េស αž“ិαž„αž’ាមេរិαž€αž›ើαž‚ោαž›αž“αž™ោαž”ាαž™αžŸαž“្តិសុαžαž’αž“្αžαžšαž‡ាតិαž–េαž‰αž˜ួαž™αž‘αžŸαžœαž្សរ៍αž†្αž“ាំ 1930 αž–េαž›αž្αž›ះαž”ាαž“αž”αž„្ហាαž‰αžា αž›αž€្ខណៈវិαž“ិαž…្αž†័αž™αžŸំខាαž“់αŸ—αž‘ាំαž„αž’αžŸ់αž“ៃαžšαž…αž“ាសម្αž–័αž“្αž’αž˜ិαž“αž›្ធ៖ ធ្αž“αž€αž‡ំαž“ាαž‰αžŠែαž›αž˜ាαž“αž€ាαžšαž’αž”់រំមិαž“αž”ាαž“αž™αž›់αž–្αžšαž˜αž›ើαžšαž…αž“ាសម្αž–័αž“្αž’αž“ៃαž”αž‰្ហាαž“αž™ោαž”ាαž™-αž™ោαž’ាαž“ោះαž‘េ។ αž€ារសម្រេαž…αž…ិត្αžαž›ើαž’αž“ាαž‚αžαž“ៃαžŸαž„្រ្αž‚ាម αž”្αžšαž†ាំαž„αž“ឹαž„αž•្αž‘ៃខាαž„αž€្រោαž™αž“ៃαž€ាαžšαž•្αž›ាស់αž”្តូαžšαž”αž…្αž…េαž€αžœិαž‡្αž‡ាαžšαž‰្αž‡ួαž™αžŠី αž‚ោαž›αž›αž‘្αž’ិ αž“ិαž„αž€ាαžšαž•្αž›ាស់αž”្តូαžšαž“αž™ោαž”ាαž™αž€៏αž“ៅαž†្αž„ាαž™αž–ីαž—ាαž–αžŸាαž˜αž‰្αž‰αžŠែរ។

Military Concept Art

Military Android Concept Art | FreelancerSource: cdn2.f-cdn.com

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